Liberal Imperialism

Jedediah Purdy 

“Liberal Empire: Assessing the Arguments”

Ethics & International Affairs 17/2, (Fall 2003) 

Purdy defines imperialism as the view that 

(1) states or peoples are politically unequal, and 

(2) this inequality can help justify military intervention.  

There are two kinds of imperialism. Weak imperialism holds that states are unequal in their ability to represent the will of their peoples. Strong imperialism holds that peoples are unequal in their capacity for self-rule.  Weak or strong, liberal imperialism holds that states might justifiably impose democratic political arrangements on foreign peoples in order to render them capable of self-rule.  Purdy aims to undermine what he takes to be the three central arguments for liberal imperialism.  I'll summarize Purdy's objections to liberal imperialism in subsequent posts; here I will simply outline his gloss of the arguments he will attack. (Names for the arguments are my addition.)

1. The Global Security Argument. Liberal imperialists argue that imperial policy is prudent, because it promotes global security.  The combined threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction mean that “global security may require that entire regimes be brought forcibly to heel” (37).  He does not mention the so-called "Democratic Peace Hypothesis," which suggests that liberal societies tend not to go to war with one another, but presumably he has something like this in mind.

2. The Human Flourishing Argument. Liberal imperialists argue that the promotion of (a specific conception of) human flourishing justifies imperial policy: “Such a consideration begins from an idea of what the most basic and general human interests are, and proposes that the domination of one people by another, at least for a time, may be necessary to achieve them” (37).  

3. The Duty of Assistance Argument. Finally, liberal imperialists argue, along deontological lines, that imperial policy may be justified as a means to stop or prevent certain prohibited actions, such as genocide or other severe wrongs.  Purdy does not appear to explain why the prohibition of genocide and similar atrocities would help support a specifically liberal imperialism, but presumably such an argument would need to claim that state violations of democratic rights are severe enough in kind to warrant coercive intervention by external force. 

The Security Council and the Cold War

Summary: Christine Gray.
International Law and the Use of Force. 
Oxford University Press (2004).
Chapter 7: "The UN and the Use of Force," pp. 195-205.

The UN Security Council was originally intended to be the locus of sovereignty for a new body of global governance. Made up of five permanent members--Russia, China, the UK, France, and the United States--and ten (?) more members elected for two-year terms, the Security Council was supposed to have direct command over its own armed forces, with which it could intervene, when necessary, to repair breachs of the peace or acts of aggression.  Its legal authority is mostly spelled out in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

But that vision of global governance never came to pass.  First, the UN was unable to levy troops or commandeer resources the way Article 43 said it should be able to.  And second, the Soviet Union and the United States alternately used their veto powers to prevent the Security Council from authorizing interventions, effectively paralyzing it throughout the Cold War. Despite having been derailed by non-compliance with Article 43 and by superpower gridlock during the Cold War, in 1988 the Security Council again began to authorize interventions. But in them meantime, the General Assembly co-opted the authority to authorize interventions itself, giving rise to a practice now called 'peacekeeping', and started issuing recommendations to the Security Council on matters actively under its consideration.  

These actions were in direct violation of Articles 11 and 12 of the UN Charter, yet in spite of the lack of any legal justification, peacekeeping operations are now accepted as legal by all member states.  Fifteen instances of peacekeeping occurred during the Cold War, and Gray and others observe that the practice of peacekeeping underwent four distinct stages of development between 1948 and 1988: nascent (1948-56: Middle East, India/Pakistan, North Korea), assertive (1956-67: Suez, Lebanon, Congo, West New Guinea, Yemen, Cyprus, India/Pakistan, Dominican Republic), dormant (1967-73; no interventions), and resurgent (1974-1987: Suez, Golan Heights, Lebanon,  Iran-Iraq).   This process has greatly eroded the separation of powers between the General Assembly and the Security Council, and in practice the two now appear able to accomplish many of the same political functions.

Immediately following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 660, which declared a breach of international peace and security and demanded that Iraqi troops withdraw.  Shortly thereafter, the UN also passed Resolution 678, which authorized 'all necessary means' to uphold Resolution 660, a generally accepted euphemism for the use of force.  This was to be a model for subsequent authorizations.  [Incidentally, it is Resolution 678 that the UK used to justify its intervention in Iraq in 2003.  They claimed that Iraq's violation of the cease-fire agreement reinstated the authorization granted in Resolution 678, which had merely been suspended, not terminated.  In any case, Gray claims that "the optimism prevalent at the time of Resolution 678 has since dissipated." (205)]

State of Peace

The Global Peace Index methodology uses 23 measures of peace:

Measures of Ongoing Domestic & Intl Conflict

• Number of external and internal conflicts fought: 2002-07
• Estimated number of deaths from organized conflict (external)
• Number of deaths from organized conflict (internal)
• Level of organized conflict (internal)
• Relations with neighbouring countries

Measures of Social Society and Security

• Perceptions of criminality in society
• Number of displaced people as a percentage of the population
• Political instability
• Level of disrespect for human rights (Political Terror Scale)
• Potential for terrorist acts
• Number of homicides per 100,000 people
• Level of violent crime
• Likelihood of violent demonstrations
• Number of jailed population per 100,000 people
• Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people

Measures of Militarization

• Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP
• Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people
• Volume of transfers (imports) of major conventional weapons per 100,000 people
• Volume of transfers (exports) of major conventional weapons per 100,000 people
• Funding for UN peacekeeping missions: outstanding contributions versus annual assessment to the budget of the current peacekeeping missions
• Aggregate number of heavy weapons per 100,000 people
• Ease of access to small arms and light weapons
• Military capability/sophistication